Introduction
China’s expanding global investment footprint reflects a shift in how states project influence in the international system. Once primarily a recipient of foreign capital, China has, over the past two decades, become one of the world’s most assertive investors, leveraging foreign direct investment and large-scale infrastructure projects to strengthen diplomatic ties, open markets, and access strategic resources.
The Western Balkans, a region with fragile institutions, unresolved ethnic tensions, and protracted paths toward European Union integration, presents fertile ground for external actors pursuing influence. China has identified this geopolitical vacuum as an opportunity. While the European Union remains the dominant economic partner for most Balkan states, its delayed accession process and bureaucratic conditionality have made Chinese capital an attractive alternative for local governments seeking rapid infrastructure development and politically unconditional funding.
Theoretical Framework
The concepts of economic diplomacy and geoeconomics offer valuable lenses through which to interpret China’s activities in the Balkans. Economic diplomacy refers to the use of economic tools by states to achieve foreign policy goals. This includes trade negotiations, foreign aid, investment strategies, and participation in multilateral economic institutions. Geoeconomics, a related but more strategic concept, emphasizes the deliberate use of economic instruments to produce geopolitical advantages.
China’s foreign policy blends both approaches. Through State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), concessional loans, bilateral agreements, and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing mobilizes its economic assets not just for commercial returns but to reshape global alignments. These investments are not ideologically driven. Rather, they aim to build long-term partnerships, access markets and critical infrastructure, and project soft power, all while maintaining a posture of political non-interference.
Overview of Chinese Investments in the Balkans
Chinese investment in the Western Balkans is dominated by large infrastructure projects, particularly in transportation, energy, and industrial production. Serbia is the most significant recipient of Chinese capital in the region. Projects include the Belgrade-Budapest railway, the Smederevo steel plant acquisition by Hesteel, and the construction of highways and energy facilities. These initiatives have been executed largely by SOEs, such as China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) and PowerChina, often funded through loans from China’s Exim Bank.
In Montenegro, China funded the Bar-Boljare highway project, representing nearly one-fifth of the country’s GDP. The loan terms, currency denomination, and arbitration clauses raised concerns over sovereignty and debt sustainability. In North Macedonia, Chinese companies have been awarded contracts for road construction projects, though some have been accompanied by allegations of corruption and opacity.
Hungary, though an EU member, has also welcomed Chinese investment under the 17+1 framework. The Budapest-Belgrade rail line, co-financed by Chinese and Hungarian institutions, represents China’s strategic interest in connecting Piraeus Port (controlled by COSCO) to Central Europe.
While state actors dominate major projects, some private Chinese companies have engaged in the region, especially in telecommunications and technology. Huawei and ZTE have expanded their presence, raising questions among EU and NATO partners about cybersecurity and strategic infrastructure resilience.
Diplomatic and Political Dimensions
China’s activities in the Balkans align with the broader strategic objectives of the Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013. The BRI enables China to establish transport and energy corridors that bypass traditional Western-controlled routes and promote the internationalization of the yuan. The Western Balkans, positioned between Europe and Asia, are pivotal to the so-called Balkan Silk Road.
Politically, China maintains a stance of non-interference in internal affairs, a position that resonates with Balkan governments seeking investment without democratic conditionality. This approach contrasts sharply with the European Union, whose funding and accession talks are tied to complex governance reforms.
China’s strategy often involves bilateral agreements with limited transparency and engagement with local parliaments. This has raised governance concerns, especially regarding procurement processes, environmental standards, and long-term fiscal impacts. The reliance on Chinese loans, particularly those denominated in foreign currencies, has also led to fears of debt traps, as evidenced by Montenegro’s highway case.
Furthermore, China’s use of cultural diplomacy, educational exchange, and media partnerships under the 17+1 platform has bolstered its soft power in the region. Confucius Institutes, student scholarships, and high-level visits have complemented economic engagement with political symbolism.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
China’s growing presence in the Western Balkans represents a deliberate and multifaceted strategy of economic diplomacy. Through a combination of state-led investment, strategic infrastructure projects, and soft power initiatives, Beijing is reshaping the region’s external alignments, often at the expense of Western influence.
For due diligence and intelligence professionals, these dynamics present critical challenges and opportunities. The opacity of Chinese financing mechanisms, the complex ownership structures of SOEs, and the geopolitical sensitivities surrounding strategic assets demand robust investigative capacity and risk assessment frameworks. Enhanced scrutiny of contractual terms, arbitration clauses, and political exposure is essential.
As China continues to blend commerce with statecraft, the role of due diligence expands beyond financial verification into the realm of geopolitical risk analysis. Understanding the full implications of Chinese investment in the Western Balkans is not only an economic necessity but a strategic imperative for institutions engaged in the region.